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I
In Zen one is called upon to investigate the most urgent matter of the self, 
to elucidate the great matter of life and death. In Western terms, we might 
say that this even includes bringing to light the inseparably related prob­
lems of the soul, the world, and God as they converge in the problem of 
oneself. When the phrase "investigation of self*’* 1 is used in this compre­
hensive yet convergent sense, I think it most aptly indicates the unique 
character of the standpoint of Zen. Zen is the standpoint which exhaus­
tively investigates the self itself. It is also spoken of as the way which sees 
through to the original face of the self.
• This is a translation of “Zen no tachiba,” in KozaZen, Volume I (Tokyo: Chikuma 
Shobo, 1967), pp. 5-28; revisions have been made by the author in collaboration with 
the translator.
1 Koji kyOrnei is a phrase found in the Yuikai or Admonitions of Daitd
Kokushi 1282-1338) which are recorded in one of the biographies, but
not in the or Goroku, of Daitd. The passage in the original admonishes one to
devote his time to a single-minded investigation of himself. See Okuda Shdzd, Kdzen 
Daitd Kokushi Nenpu, Tokyo: Morie Shoten, 1933, p. 33.
When we speak of the self, usually we mean the self which is conscious 
of or has come to reflect on itself. This self has self-consciousness as its 
essence, and never parts from it. An investigation of the self itself would 
in this case mean a delving into the conscious self, and could take the form 
of becoming deeply immersed in one’s own consciousness. When the 
matter takes on this kind of meaning, the investigation of self becomes 
sheer subjectivism. Where the self is investigated from the standpoint of 
self-consciousness, it internally makes itself into a screen, as it were, upon 
which it observes the stream of consciousness—the various sensations, 
emotions, desires, representations, conceptions and the like, arising and 
disappearing. The self is at the same time both the images moving upon 
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the screen and their spectator. And such a mode of being is intrinsic to 
man, conscious as he is of himself.
A state of consciousness like that described above becomes particularly 
prominent in adolescence, when self-consciousness is intensified. The 
adolescent has a greater tendency to cut himself off from his surroundings, 
make an issue of himself, and shut himself up inside himself. This tendency 
makes it difficult for him to adapt to society and lends him a certain 
nervousness. When excessive, it frequently brings on neurosis, and can even 
lead to suicide. The person who resists and attempts to sustain himself at 
any cost consciously seeks solitude and drifts into a dimension of being 
which deviates from ordinary social life. Like Dostoevski’s protagonists, 
he becomes a dweller in an attic (Raskolnikov), or in “the underground.” 
By constantly being preoccupied with himself in that realm of solitude, he 
comes to concentrate on some notion or other, to cling to fixed ideas, and 
to tend increasingly toward monomania. This is a kind of pathological 
concentration on oneself, or psychic self-closure, an inclination toward 
so-called autism. Such pathological deepening of self-consciousness is 
accompanied by what may be called a fanaticism of consciousness, a kind 
of maniacal fervor.
This shutting off of the self in the secluded mind sometimes shows up as 
fanatical behavior of the sort exhibited by some demonstrating students, 
by the Chinese Red Guard and international “red armies,” by punk rockers 
and by juvenile delinquents on the rise in the modern world. As much 
as the motivations for their actions may differ, one has the feeling that they 
have something in common with respect to their individual mental condi­
tions. Fundamentally, moreover, the same mental condition lies behind 
both their case and the inclination toward neurosis, leading to suicide. This 
basic common character is the tendency for the self situated in the field of 
self-consciousness to close itself off, to concentrate vacuously on its own 
interior. This might also be said to be a primitive form of subjectivism, 
which, in a much higher dimension, reveals itself in various forms in the 
areas of art, thought and praxis. But what is meant here by the investiga­
tion of self is completely different from such a standpoint of subjectivism.
To investigate the self itself really means to assume a standpoint which 
is completely freed from any subjective, vacuous attachment or biased 
clinging to the self; indeed, the investigation of self first becomes possible 
from such a standpoint. It must exclude any sort of self-fascination or 
self-aversion, narcissism or self-torment. The investigation of self is the 
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standpoint which attempts to know the self itself, just as it is, in its original 
mode of being. In this sense, it may also be said to be a kind of objectivism. 
But at the same time, it must be fundamentally distinguished from sheer 
objectivism.
Ordinarily, the stance which attempts to know something objectively is 
called research or study. But the investigation of self is entirely different 
from research or inquiry in this sense. The researcher, facing something 
different from himself and taking it as the object of his study, observes and 
deliberates on it. The object of study remains always object, as opposed to 
the subject conducting the research. By being an object, it inevitably comes 
to stand over against the subject. This situation in turn essentially pre­
scribes how the researcher should be, i.e., his mode of being as a re­
searcher or his stance in conducting research. It is required of the researcher 
that he disregard his own subjective feelings and wishes, and look at things 
as objectively as possible. He must discard his own preferences and value 
judgments and any prejudices arising from them, and regard the object as 
if reflecting it in an unclouded mirror. The self, however, is absolutely not 
an object. In this sense, a stance which would objectively study the self 
seems essentially self-contradictory.
Nevertheless, we are conscious of ourselves, and this self-consciousness 
implies, as described above, that the self is reflected in itself. Hence it be­
comes possible to assume a standpoint from which one objectively observes 
and studies oneself as if reflected in an unclouded mirror. From this stand­
point, the self—to continue our analogy—in addition to being the char­
acters moving on the screen, as well as their spectator, is further the direc­
tor and the critic. Here, instead of staying in the field of ordinary, everyday 
self-consciousness, one assumes the standpoint of the intellect which un­
folds from out of that field. Then, from the standpoint of the intellect, it 
becomes possible for one to take himself as an object and study himself 
objectively. In the meantime, the fact that the self essentially cannot be ob­
jectified is lost from sight.
This sort of objective self-reflection takes various shapes. In general, the 
stance of objective study is found in its purest form in science. And the 
various standpoints of objective reflection on the self under consideration 
here betray, at their base, a certain slant towards scientific research.
Among those standpoints, perhaps the one closest to us is that found in 
literature. What first comes to mind is, for example, the so-called “I novel,” 
or especially the confessional literature exemplified by Rousseau’s Con­
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fessions. However, it may be said that the novel in general basically in­
cludes its author’s self-reflection. Modem man has gradually come to be 
more self-conscious, and as a consequence there has been an increasing 
tendency in literature to shift the various problems of human life to the 
interior of the characters’ consciousness and to treat them as psychological 
conflicts. The author peers into the consciousness of his characters as if 
through psychological analysis, probes and exposes the lurking motiva­
tions in their actions and life which they themselves are barely aware of or 
unconsciously try to keep from their own eyes. In due course, this tendency 
is carried so far as to enter the domain of depth psychology. The movement 
is toward the general and the abstract, and takes on the character of what is 
generally called the study of human beings. It implies an attitude analogous 
to that of science, insofar as it involves objective analysis, the exposure of 
hidden motives, and dispassionate observation, as if seeing things reflected 
in an unclouded mirror. Yet at the basis of this study we can discern a tend­
ency within the author to reflect on the contents of his own consciousness.
The development within modern literature of the novel is particularly 
significant, then, not only because this genre has shown as inclination to 
psychological analysis which is similar to science in its objectivity, but also 
because it is linked to the fact that modem man has become self-conscious, 
self-reflective. In this sense, it can be said that the modem novel is funda­
mentally, if covertly, of a confessional nature. Hence the scientific char­
acter which the modem novel displays is linked at bottom to its confessional 
nature. In Japanese literature this is most clearly seen in authors such as 
Natsume Soseki and Akutagawa Ryunosuke. In genres other than the 
novel, the so-called moralists, beginning with writers such as Montaigne 
and Pascal, reveal a standpoint of the same nature. In academic fields, it 
appears above all in the evolution of psychology, ranging from introspec­
tive psychology to psychoanalysis and depth psychology.
Yet what we find in the self-reflection conducted from these various 
standpoints is not self-investigation in its original sense, but rather a study 
of human beings. What comes under observation in the moralists and in 
the novel in general, to say nothing of psychology, is something universal— 
the “human being” in every individual. That is to say, to observe from the 
outside, to analyze in various ways and expose the will, desires, and im­
pulses functioning in the depths of our consciousness is to see the universal 
“human being” in each of us. Even when something of a wholly individual 
confessional nature lies behind the author’s own self-reflection, it is always 
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something that can be projected into, and is reflected from, the study of 
the human being in his works. It is not confession in its original sense, as 
moral or religious confession, which involves the completely solitary self 
and concentrates on the self as an individual. Rather, the consciousness 
of the self revealed in such literature and psychology is inevitably displayed 
in such a way that its contents appear capable of being universalized at any 
time. In effect, the self which sees itself and the self which is seen by itself, 
although actually one and the same, are split in two. The standpoint of the 
individual and integral self, and of the investigation of that self, is not found 
here. Figuratively speaking, it is rather a standpoint where one would gaze 
at one’s own face in a mirror and try to scrutinize disinterestedly the shape 
of the nose, mouth and ears, or even the eyes and facial expressions; a 
standpoint which resembles the scientific one mentioned before. Despite its 
being the self-reflection of a novelist or “moralist,” insofar as it is of the 
nature of an objective study of man, there is basically something about it 
which is like a child making faces in the mirror. It is like searching out what 
sort of face—threatening, or sad, or kind and lovable—lies hidden behind 
the ordinary appearance of the face.
Nevertheless, behind the study of the human being reflected in the mirror 
of the intellect lies yet another standpoint. And this standpoint is a neces­
sary condition for that of the intellect to arise. When we arrive at this 
standpoint, the aforementioned distinction between the self which sees 
and the self which is seen breaks down, and the situation takes a com­
plete turn. This standpoint becomes manifest when, to continue our anal­
ogy, I look at myself in a mirror and notice that the one in the mirror is 
looking at the one outside the mirror. Ordinarily, when we see our own face 
reflected in the mirror, we pay no attention to this. Or at least our attention 
is rarely focused on this. Nevertheless, the one looking at oneself in the 
mirror is, conversely, always seen by the same one who appears in the 
mirror. When we attentively fix our gaze on our own eyes, they gaze back 
at us from within the mirror. This is likely to disturb anyone the instant it 
is noticed. The situation here is completely different from that of observing 
oneself in the mirror. Here there is no longer any distinction between being 
“inside” the mirror and being “outside” it. The inside is outside and the 
outside inside. Here the threatening, sad, or kind and lovable look in one’s 
eyes, like the equivalent facial expressions, all vanish into the gazing eyes. 
Here remain only the eyes that have come to gaze directly at the eyes of 




This situation is comparable to two mirrors mutually reflecting one 
another with nothing in between to produce an image. This, then, is no 
longer an observation of the objective self. The self is neither the subjec­
tively colored mirror of self-consciousness, nor is it an image reflected in 
the mirror of the intellect in which any such haze has been wiped away. In 
other words, it is not the self represented within itself as an object. For the 
intellect comes into being where the immediate self-knowledge contained 
in every form of our consciousness is refracted, so to speak, toward its own 
interior, and becomes reflective self-knowledge. The latter level might be 
likened to a sort of screen which, while reflecting an image, also reflects 
itself at the same time, thus making the image three-dimensional—similar 
to the case of the universal human being seen directly in the perception of 
each individual. In a word, it is the dimension of the “for itself” of Hegelian 
and Sartrian philosophy. Yet, as was said earlier, the self in which the self 
that sees and the self that is seen are completely one, the self which in no 
sense is an object or a representation of an object, belongs to a field trans­
cending even the dimension of the intellect. The self which cannot be ob­
jectified or represented in any manner whatsoever is outside all forms of 
consciousness, including the intellect. On the other hand, it is not simply 
the unconscious, nor is it some “thing” taken as being outside our con­
sciousness or mind. Such notions as “the unconscious” and “external 
things” are conceived from the standpoint of consciousness and intellect, 
and consequently already entail an interpretation.
The self of the field that transcends the dimenstion of consciousness and 
intellect is a self of which it can only be said that it is. And this being 
simpliciter of the self lies from the very beginning at the bottom of the self 
which one is conscious of or reflects on intellectually. It is the self-in- 
itself, prior to any self which is “for itself.” But although we say that this 
self is there from the very beginning, it comes to be manifest for the first 
time when the dimension of self-consciousness and intellect has been pene­
trated and swept aside. It is in this sense that we return to our own self 
which was there from the beginning. This manifestation of our own selfs 
being simpliciter can also be called the self-concentration of our being, in 
the sense that our own self has returned to itself. This self-concentration, 
however, is completely different from the autistic self-concentration of 
self-consciousness mentioned earlier. Again, though we may call it the be­
ing simpliciter of the self, it is fundamentally different from a thing’s simply 
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being there. For this “oneself is” or “I am” is a mode of self-being that 
permits no objectification whatsoever. Its authentic manifestation takes 
place on a field which transcends the dimension of the intellect and its grasp 
of the self. This field is simultaneously both that of the being simpliciter of 
the self and that of knowing simpliciter, the knowing which is prior to and 
at the root of all knowledge by way of intellect. It is only here, on such a 
field, that we can take account of the way known in Zen as the investigat- 
tion of self.
In order to elucidate this matter a little further, let us try to contrast it 
briefly with the existence of the self in Descartes’ famous “I think, therefore 
I am.”
ii
. A direction resembling the investigation of self in Zen can be said to 
have occurred in the West too from ancient times. In particular, Socrates* 
“know thyself** was a fundamental criticism of those caught up in purely 
subjective opinion (doxa) regarding themselves, or in views voiced from the 
standpoint of sophistic intellect based on such opinion; it was a criticism 
which completely uprooted their position and way of life. Socrates’ dictum 
was an appeal to realize that this was not true knowledge, to discard all 
opinions and intellectual analysis, to return directly to the present ex­
istence of the self itself and from there to inquire into oneself anew. We 
can say that this was something which pointed out the way to the true self 
and true knowledge. There may be various views of the significance Soc­
rates has, but I think that by indicating in this manner that there is a prob­
lem of inquiry into the self itself, and by opening up a way to such self­
inquiry, Socrates possesses a peerless significance in all of Western history. 
The tradition of Western philosophy beginning with Plato and Aristotle 
also arose from there; it can be said, however, that that is only one side of 
Socrates’ significance.
We can see a similar direction during the Christian era, particularly in 
the case of Augustine. Desperately seeking God as the “life of my soul, 
the life of my life,” he made the way of investigating the self itself the main 
axis of his whole existence. But by the time he reached this point, he had 
undergone a period of profound doubt jolting the conceptual standpoint 
he himself was embracing. In his case as well, self-investigation became the 
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source of his philosophic thought, and in turn the source of medieval 
scholastic philosophy; but again, that is only one side of the significance 
he has. The other side lies in his religious practice of seeking peace of mind, 
or, for him, repose in God. As in the case of Socrates, for Augustine too 
the love of knowledge which gives rise to philosophy was backed up by a 
practice of self-investigation which sought a resting place for his own ex­
istence.
Just as classical Greek philosophy began with Socrates and orthodox 
medieval philosophy made Augustine its source, modem philosophy has 
its founder in Descartes. Descartes can be said to have such significance in 
that he shook off the fetters of scholastic thought and cut open the way to 
methodical doubt. This was, for him too, an inquiry into the self itself. He 
says, for instance, at the end of his first Discourse on Method, “I resolved 
one day to study also myself and to use all the powers of my mind to choose 
the paths which I should follow” (Sutcliffe trans.).
In fact, by taking this path he attained the indubitable conviction 
through which he could proclaim “I am.” Until he reached that point, he 
proceeded by considering as unreliable anything that could be doubted for 
any reason whatsoever. In his case too the method of philosophy was im­
plicitly a method of self-investigation. It was his resolve—and his practice— 
in self-investigation to adopt this method and carry it through rigorously. 
Thus he placed everything in doubt, from all things appearing in the world 
to studies like mathematics and even the existence of God. Mathematics, 
as the principle and the exemplar of all studies, was not something to be 
doubted, but Descartes took into account the possibility of regarding 
mathematical truths as deceptions in his mind due to an all-powerful, 
deceiving god. In this manner all things were enveloped in doubt; all things 
became one layer of a great doubt. This great doubt gave birth to the cer­
tainty of the cogito, a certainty possessing a sense of self-evidence: the only 
thing which could not be doubted was that he himself was doubting. This 
cogito, functioning from the very beginning and always behind the process 
of the doubt encompassing all things, had been intensifying its self­
concentration more and more until at last it returned to itself. And the 
awareness of having returned to its own “self” which was there from the 
beginning became the consciousness of the certainty and self-evidence of 
the “I think” and of the “I am” fashioned after the “I think.”
This was a kind of conversion, similar to religious conversion, like the 
experience Socrates probably had, and which Augustine certainly ex-
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perienced. It meant coming upon a resting place for one’s own existence, 
attaining an “unshakable peace of mind.” Only it was not attained in the 
form of religious faith, but through the path of investigating the self itself. 
Accordingly, this peace of mind not only signified that one had directly 
attested to the certainty of one’s own being, but entailed, at the same time, 
a self-awareness in the form of knowing oneself. The certainty of existence 
meant a realized self-awareness, and vice versa. The certitude Descartes 
discovered in coming to the realization “I think, therefore I am” was of 
this nature. This “I am” suggests the actuality of the self in ordinary life; 
but insofar as the “I am” denotes the point of return of a self which under­
went a radical doubt and its reversal, the way of self-investigation en­
folded in it is far from ordinary. It is, rather, an “I am” possessing a 
philosophically (i.e., ontologically) founded certainty. It is not the kind of 
“I am” that anyone is aware of, as already misunderstood by philosophers 
of that time. The same holds for the “I think”: although it expresses the 
activity of ordinary consciousness, it likewise is formulated on the basis of 
a philosophically founded awareness and not simply on the basis of the 
self-consciousness everyone has. And the “therefore” (ergo) was not a word 
indicating a logical inference, but does nothing more than mark, like a 
milestone, the turnabout which took place in the course of Descartes’ 
self-investigation.
The way by which Descartes arrived at the existence and realized aware­
ness of the self was in nature close to the Zen investigation of self. From 
that point on, however, the character of his thinking took a new turn. 
Taking the “I think, therefore I am” as a new starting point, he proceeded 
to the problem of God and further to the problem of our cognitive knowl­
edge of the natural world and things in it. When he used methodical doubt, 
all these matters were held in reservation; but now his thinking persistently 
took on the character of inference.
The central task of his thinking concerning God was a proof of God’s 
existence. The clue to the answer to this problem was found in the idea of 
something infinite and perfect discovered in his own soul, and in the 
speculation regarding the source of that idea. Insofar as this can be said to 
be an investigation of his own mind and soul, perhaps it meant for Des­
cartes a continuation of his self-investigating which gave rise to “I think, 
therefore I am.” Descartes’ concept of meditatio seems in large measure to 
have such a connotation. However, this was no longer a further deepening of 
that way which directly attested to the certainty of the self’s existence, nor 
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did it entail a development of realized self-awareness. His intent was to 
establish ultimate certainty for the soul of the self by basing and securing 
it on the demonstrated existence of God, or rather, by proving that it was 
from the very beginning ontologically founded on God’s existence. That 
however was a path of thought which added one certain inference onto 
another; and the certainty of self-existence established thereby was qualita­
tively different from the certainty given by direct attestation of the self 
itself.
For example, Descartes takes up the matter of an ontological proof of 
God’s existence; the purport of this is that in God all possibilities as such 
are already actuality, therefore God actually exists. Yet even granting 
that this proof has speculative certainty, it has nothing to do with the 
certainty of self-existence or of realized self-awareness as it was given by 
direct attestation. After all, in Descartes the certainty of self-existence 
came to a halt when it was made the point of departure of philosophical 
thought, and was not assigned any meaning above and beyond that. And 
considering it in retrospect, Descartes’ way of self-investigation was cul­
tivated with this intent in mind from the very beginning. This is already 
apparent in the fact that his doubt was carried out “methodically,” as a 
method. This methodical doubt, however, was not doubt in its authentic 
sense, a doubt which grips one’s whole body-mind, in which the self and all 
other things in their entirety become one big question-mark, as is the case 
with the “great doubt” in Zen. Rather, Descartes’ point of arrival is the 
place where the great doubt, in the authentic sense of the word, first begins. 
The great doubt does not consist in excluding various possible data by 
means of doubt in its usual sense. Rather it begins with the Cartesian sum 
cogitans, the self-knowing self-being, the ego itself. It begins where the 
very self which has been brought back to itself by way of such ordinary 
doubt, which has returned to its own self-being simpliciter, once again be­
comes problematic for and to itself.
This problem appears in such questions as “Where do I come from and 
where am I going?” That is to say, it is the question seeking the very ground 
of self-being, the primal source of one’s own heart or mind. This is not an 
intellectual question, or one which can be answered by speculative thought. 
When existence itself turns into a question, an answer can only come from 
the act of existing itself, an act directed toward existence itself. The investi­
gation of self is the practice of such an act; and the knowledge arising from 
this investigation, as something that consists in persistent practice, must 
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have the character of direct attestation and realized self-awareness.
In Descartes’ case, to seek the ground of the self’s existence or the source 
of one’s mind meant to prove the existence of God. Descartes thereby 
attempted to give a foundation to the relation between the self and the 
world with all its things, in the sense that he sought a metaphysical guar­
antee that the self is able to have physical knowledge of the world. Here 
one might expect that, in addition to God and the world, moral relations 
between the self and others or, to put it more broadly, the personal “I- 
Thou” relationship, would become a further problem; but Descartes did 
not go so far as to enter into this matter. For Augustine as well the 
problem of the soul led to the problem of God. Or rather, the problem of 
the soul was from the beginning oriented towards the problem of God. In 
the case of Socrates, the problem of the soul was linked to that of ethical 
relations with other people in the polis.
But the investigation of self which is the problem under consideration 
here is not a point of departure for the solution of the problem concerning 
God, the world and all its things, or other people. For in the investigation 
of self the point of departure is the “great doubt” in the sense mentioned 
earlier; and here Cartesian self-existence, having returned to the self by 
way of a skepsis toward all things including God and the world, itself be­
comes fundamentally problematic. Accordingly, the relation with God, 
with the world and all its things, or with other people can provide no 
answer to a self which has become problematic. Standpoints based on one 
or another of these relationships and attempting to provide a solution to 
the self have arisen in great variety, whether as religions or as philosophies 
seeking a foundation in the natural world or in society.
But the way of investigating the self which has become problematic in 
terms of the great doubt refuses any ready solution established from such 
standpoints. For the self questioning its very existence, anything coming 
from outside the self itself is not acknowledged as having authority, nor 
as capable of being relied upon. In this sense, the self is through and 
through “self-centered.” The answer that solves the problem of the self 
can only arise from within the self itself. The problem which occurs when 
the very existence of the self becomes problematic for itself is one of this 
nature. The self itself becomes a problem for and to the self in such a way 
that the depth of God, the breadth of the world, and the closeness of per­
sonal relations all simply indicate the range in which the great doubt should 
be deployed, the range of the investigation where the self asks and the self 
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answers, the horizon which should be opened within that investigation.
In the East as well there have been various religious and philosophical 
ideas since ancient times. In particular, the Mahayana Buddhism from 
which Zen derived gave rise to numerous profound systems of doctrine 
ever since Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu. For the most part these have been 
worked out relying on some sutra or sutras regarded as the direct teaching 
of Sfikyamuni. The investigation of self in Zen, on the other hand, is not 
founded on any doctrine, does not depend on any scriptural authority. The 
activity of speculative thinking which does such things as developing and 
interpreting doctrines is a path qualitatively different from the investigation 
of self. It is, rather, an obstacle to such investigation. Both abiding in faith 
in the Buddha, and being caught up in a web of doctrines, cover up the 
original face of the self. That is, they obstruct the self in attaining ultimate 
realization, in regaining its original self and truly becoming itself.
The standpoint of Zen advocates a “special transmission outside the 
teachings, not relying on words or letters.” Perhaps this expresses that 
Sakyamuni’s perfect enlightenment, his awakening as Buddha, i.e., his 
Buddha-mind, is transmitted directly just as it is. But it also designates the 
path whereby the self attains realization as itself, whereby it truly becomes 
itself. Here the Buddha, the world, and human society speculated upon in 
Buddhist doctrine, although once lost from sight in the great doubt, may 
come to appear again within the self-realization which has overcome the 
great doubt as the content of self-investigation, as that which is essentially 
inseparable from the self to be investigated. If they do so, we may ask: as 
what do “the self,” “human beings,” or “the mind” reveal themselves, 
when seen from the viewpoint of the self-realization usually called satori! 
And, in connection with that, we may also ask: what becomes of other 
associated problems such as that concerning Buddha, or the world, or 
interhuman relations?
Searching out these matters may provide a clue for further clarification 
of the unique character of the standpoint of Zen. This again is the prob­
lem of what it means to say that Zen is the standpoint of “directly pointing 
to man’s mind, seeing into one’s own true nature and becoming Buddha.”
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“Directly pointing to man’s mind. ...” How is “man’s mind” con­
ceived in this expression? The term mind is one which is constantly used 
throughout Buddhism, not only in Zen. What does this term refer to? 
Generally speaking, how we conceive the mind is thought to radically 
influence how we view the human being. The same holds true for how we 
view “the self’: the way we view the mind may give rise to various ways of 
thinking when we investigate the self. The divergence in the Eastern and 
Western views of man may be said to be based on the difference in how the 
mind is thought of, and in turn how the self is viewed.
Ordinarily we think of ourselves as having a mind, or that there is a 
mind within us. When the mind is thought of as the unity of various 
faculties such as sensation, the appetites, cognition and the like, then the 
self becomes that which possesses these faculties. And since all things in 
the world, including human beings, are known only via the self’s sensations 
and intellect, the self is the vantage point from which all things come to be 
seen. In this sense, the self takes on the appearance of always being located 
at the center of everything. The mental faculties of the self are like beams 
of light emitted in all directions from this center. Entailed by this notion 
of self is a mode of being: it is itself the center of the world. The self sees 
and grasps the self placing itself in the center, opposite all other things. 
This is the self’s self-centered mode of being and way of seeing. That is, 
thinking of the self as having a mind, and thinking of this mind as the unity 
of various faculties, both reflect the self’s self-centered mode of being.
On the other hand, a completely opposite way of viewing matters is also 
possible, and in fact has existed since ancient times. In contrast to viewing 
the mind from the vantage point of one’s “self,” the mind is seen from the 
vantage point of the “world.” The various mental faculties the self has 
within it are faculties which, objectively considered, apply all around to 
other living beings in the world as well. Other animals also have sensations 
and appetites. Intelligence too was regarded by the ancients as being com­
mon not only to human beings but to heavenly beings or angels as well. 
And today it is possible to think that intelligence of a sort may exist within 
some living beings on other planets in the universe.
From this viewpoint, that which is seen as the faculties the self “pos­
sesses” within it, each “faculty” or “power” sui generis, can also be seen as 
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something which extends throughout the world and has universality. 
Accordingly, the “mind” as the unity of all these powers, in the same man­
ner as the “life” viewed as their wellspring, is thought to have a universal 
mode of being on the world-plane. In fact, ancient peoples regarded psyche 
or nous, soul or mind, under the aspect of such a universality. We can see a 
similar trait in the way modern sciences such as biology and psychology 
view such matters; their “objective” stance supports claims about uni­
versality. In any case, this sort of viewpoint gave rise to the idea of a 
cosmic life and concommitantly of a cosmic soul or mind. Today there are 
people who even speak of cosmic consciousness. Assuming a different way 
of viewing things then, the mind or faculties within us can be seen as some­
thing extending to all other living beings, with the world as its field. From 
this perspective, the “minds” which exist within all individual living things 
or human beings are individualizations of the great “mind” extending 
throughout the world.
There is a Japanese proverb used, sometimes humorously, in asserting 
oneself or one's rights: “Even an inch-long worm has its own half-inch 
soul.” Here the universal soul is individualized in a single worm, forming 
the worm’s own self-nature (svabhava). It becomes, so to speak, the root 
will or Nietzsche’s “will to power,” by virtue of which the worm asserts its 
own right of existence in this world. The same can be said of the human 
soul. Viewing things from the perspective of the “world,” there is no funda­
mental distinction between animals and human beings. Buddhism’s view of 
humans as “sentient beings,” and hence as equal to all other animal 
species, derives from such a way of seeing.
The way of seeing which sees the mind from the field of the world forms 
the basis of diverse myths in both East and West, and has found its way 
into various religions and philosophies. It constitutes from the beginning a 
strong undercurrent in the history of Western philosophy, where concepts 
like World-soul and World-mind have often appeared. Suffice it here to 
cite as examples the names of Anaxagoras, Plotinus and Schelling. Viewed 
from such a perspective, the “mind” assumes rather the central position in 
the universe or world and forms the vantage point from which all things 
are to be seen. The minds of individual living beings, as well as of in­
dividual humans, are as it were beams of light emitted from that center. 
We cannot go into details here, but a way of seeing along these lines has 
deeply permeated the Geistesgeschichte of the world. Looking at man as a 
microcosm over against the macrocosm, for example, derives from such a 
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way of seeing. In a word, it can be called a cosmocentric way of viewing 
the mind.
Hence there are two possible ways to view the mind, cosmocentric and 
egocentric, and in fact these two have come to be complexly interwined in 
both Eastern and Western intellectual history. In ancient Greece and 
Rome the cosmocentric way of seeing can be said to have set the underly­
ing tone of thought for the most part. But ever since Christianity became 
dominant, the main axis of thought in the West has to this day been the 
egocentric way. In Christian teaching God has personal existence, as ex­
pressed by the biblical proclamation, “I am that I am” (Exodus 3:14). The 
relationship between God and man also is a personal one, where man is 
conceived according to the dual character of his relationship toward God, 
i.e., sin and love. Man as sinner is in the state of “original sin,” symbolized 
by Adam’s defying God and eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge. 
What the biblical story gives expression to here is man’s egotistic way of 
being a “self.” The notion of man as a being having self-consciousness and 
intellectual knowledge, as a “being-for-itself,” designates a way of being 
which has rebelled against God and become independent of Him. God, on 
the other hand, sent Christ to the earth in order to redeem sinful man, and 
through Christ’s death on the cross expiated man’s sin for him. By his 
faith in Christ, i.e., by accepting in faith the grace of God, one reestablishes 
his relationship with God and is reborn “a new man.” This is a personal 
relationship with God via love.
Yet the way this Christian doctrine is conceived suggests that, both 
where sin obtains and where love obtains, God and man equally are as­
sumed to exist in the mode of self-being, that is, in the form of “I am.” 
Thus God and man stand in the so-called “I-Thou” relationship. 
Within this relationship, the mode of being an “I” prescribes the human 
being so thoroughly that no room is left for the cosmocentric way of view­
ing the mind. Consequently, the view of man in the West is to this day 
“personal” through and through; and the framing of man and ego in terms 
of “I am” is taken as something fixed, as it were, for all eternity, something 
impossible to overcome.
At the same time, the human is regarded as occupying a special place 
among all creatures, as being granted by God dominion over all other 
things. Moreover, in the modern West, this way of seeing humans as having 
a privileged existence has been removed from the sphere of Christian dog­
matics and generalized as the concept of the “person.” Essentially this con­
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cept is formed by what was previously called the self-centered way of seeing 
“the self.” Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” also issued from an investi­
gation of such a way of being a “self.” Generally speaking, the Western and 
Buddhist views completely differ on this fundamental point: the Western 
view is based on the concept of person, whereas Buddhism, standing on the 
equality of humans with all living things, bases its view on the concept of 
“sentient beings” (sattva).
The two ways of viewing the mind, cosmocentric and self-centric, have 
been inseparably preserved throughout Buddhism, in marked contrast to 
the West. At the root of this divergence is the difference between the way 
“God” is viewed and the way “Buddha” is understood. And correlative to 
this divergence in how the Absolute is seen is a divergence in the respective 
views of man. In Buddhism also, the human’s mode of being self-centered, 
and his viewing himself from within such a mode of being, have been made 
a problem to be sure. But this problem is always placed in connection with 
the cosmocentric way of viewing. In this view the mind of every living being 
is seen as something that has its center in itself and constitutes the self­
nature of that being. Referring to our proverb again, the half-inch soul in 
the one-inch worm is its self-nature, its “ego.” Man, however, possessing 
the faculty of intellect, knows himself at the same time as he knows things, 
so that his mode of being is that of an “ego” which has become self- 
conscious. Being a self-centered “ego-self,” man, in knowing things, dis­
criminates between himself and other kinds of things. As was stated pre­
viously, he places himself at the center of the world. Yet even though being 
self-conscious is peculiar to human beings, the basis of this mode of being 
lies in the fact that the “mind” of every living being includes a center or 
exists as a self-nature which takes on the character of “ego.” In man’s 
being, it can be said, this self-nature comes to appear in the form of being- 
for-itself; and the mode of existence as self-nature or “ego” common to all 
sentient beings becomes specialized into being an “ego-self.” The mode of 
being wherein each man places himself at the center of his own world is 
itself but one particular self-determination of the mode of being of uni­
versal mind, mind on the world-plane.
This universal mind generally appears in animals as a mentality capable 
of sensation and perception, and in man as a mentality enjoying, in 
addition to these, intellect. By means of this intellect man clearly discrimi­
nates one thing from another, and his self from all other things. Self and 
external world, subject and object, are divided, and man views the world of 
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objects from the self-centered vantage point of the subject. Man thereby 
exists as if he had no essential connection with other things in the world, 
as if he were removed from the sphere of the world; and he grasps himself 
by himself according to such a mode of being. In grasping the self in this 
manner, each man sees himself as though he himself alone were the center 
of the world. Yet grasping the self in this manner is itself a mode of being 
common to all men; moreover, this human mode of being is itself but one 
determinate form of the universal mind that has the world as its field.
In Buddhism, the mind that discriminates between subject and object, 
and between the mind itself and other things, has been considered from a 
holistic standpoint as part of cosmic, universal mind. As representative of 
this standpoint we can cite the theory of vijnaptimatrata, consciousness- 
only. In rough outline, the theory of consciousness-only is a system which 
places in the center of Buddhist doctrine the “mind,” ontologically speak­
ing, or “consciousness” (yijnana) epistemologically speaking, or in general, 
“mind-consciousness.” In its long course of development the theory of 
consciousness-only gave rise to hair-splitting analyses of mind-conscious­
ness and to several quite ramified standpoints, but we need not discuss 
these now. The issue here is only the most basic way of thinking in these 
doctrines.
As is commonly known, consciousness-only theory distinguishes eight 
consciousnesses. The first five are sensations such as seeing, hearing and the 
like; the sixth, mano-vijnana or thought-consciousness, unifying the first 
five, gives rise via judgment to cognitive knowledge. It seems almost com­
parable to the sensus communis and judgmental intellect combined of the 
medieval scholastic theory of mind in the West. In the seventh, manas or 
self-consciousness, the unifying function of the sixth becomes consciousness 
for-itself; here, along with self-attachment arises the notion
of ego-self, and one lapses into a self-centered way of being. Perhaps this 
could also be understood as the point where self-consciousness in the 
Western sense becomes purely for-itself, to the extent of exclaiming “I am 
I” (as does Shakespeare's King Richard2), thus revealing its self-attach­
2 King Richard III, Act 5, Scene 3: After the ghosts of Prince Edward, Henry VI 
and Clarence whom he has murdered, appear to Richard, Duke of Gloucester, now 
King Richard, he proclaims:
O coward conscience, how doest thou afflict me!
The lights bum blue. It is now dead midnight.
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ment. In any case, thus far this theory for the most part runs parallel to the 
structure of “consciousness” as it has been conceived in the West since 
ancient times. However, a fundamental difference from the Western way of 
viewing consciousness and mind appears when the Eastern doctrine posits, 
as the ground of all, an eighth root consciousness, called the alaya or store 
consciousness.
The a/aya-consciousness most aptly manifests the character of mind 
previously said to be universal on the world-plane. Constituting the basis 
of our minds, it is at the same time of the nature of what may be called a 
cosmic consciousness, or rather a cosmic unconscious. This unconscious is 
of course not to be understood merely in a psychological sense, but also as 
having ontological significance such as is implied in the concept of “life.” 
Just as the “life” of living things is thought on the one hand to be the root 
potentiality out of which faculties such as sensations, emotions, impulses, 
appetites and finally intelligence are generated, and taken on the other hand 
as pervading our flesh and giving it life, the a/aya-consciousness is under­
stood to include the aspect we call universal “life” on the world-plane. 
Speaking analogically, it might be said to include the thesis that at the root 
of and at one with cosmic “mind” is a “life” which is analogous to a human 
life, which encompasses the entire process of being conceived in one’s 
mother’s womb, maturing as a fetus, being born, growing as a human pos­
sessing consciousness, and, finally, generating one’s own child anew; a 
“life” embracing the entire spectrum of the life of the flesh, the un­
conscious, and consciousness. Such an aZaya-consciousness lies latent at 
the base of the human mind and of the minds of all living things. And the 
activity of the human mind, acting from within the sphere of the alaya- 
consciousness, sets in motion the consciousnesses up to the seventh one 
like a seed stretching out, and gives rise to our seeing, hearing, perceiving 
and knowing, our egoistic notions and ego-attachment. All these are the 
synthetic acts of the seven consciousnesses, whose influence in turn reaches 
the very depths of the mind and leaves traces in the aZaya-consciousness. 
These traces are deposited as new seeds in the aZaya-consciousness and thus 
become the potentialities for new activity in our mind-consciousness.
In short, the activity of our mind-consciousness, while comprising the 
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activities of all seven consciousnesses, and while being reflected in the ego­
self of the manor-consciousness, nevertheless has its latent cause within the 
a/oya-consciousness, so that the effects of this activity are preserved within 
its depths also. Seen from this perspective, even our ego-self is not some­
thing isolated from the world, but in its hidden interior is connected to the 
vital, unconscious layers which make the whole world their field. The ego­
self sinks roots deep within the o/aya-consciousness. The a/oya-conscious- 
ness in turn is the root cause of all activity and ceaseless change in the minds 
and bodies of all living things, including all human beings; the root cause 
of the generation and extinction, or life and death, of their very bodies and 
minds. Even from this simplified description we may catch sight of the 
fact that our egoistic mode of being is seen not within an immutable frame­
work such as the Western concept of person, but rather as having hidden 
roots outside that framework and arising only in connection with such 
roots.
Our egoistic mode of being, our being ego-selves, signifies the mode of 
being of a mind-consciousness which divides subject and object, self and 
external world, or which, in terms of vijnaptimatrata or consciousness-only 
theory, divides consciousness (yijnana) and its surrounding world of ob­
jects (yisaya), and is in this sense the discriminating mind. It is the mind 
which grasps itself as if it were isolated from the world. Nevertheless, one 
of the fundamental teachings of consciousness-only theory consists in bring­
ing to light the inauthenticity of this discriminating mind. The standpoint 
of discrimination is that of placing the ego-self in the center, regarding the 
things of the so-called external world, and becoming attached to them. But 
attachment to things is only the other side of attachment to self. It is a 
twofold process: in the course of being attached to itself, the ego-self is 
attached to things, and in the course of being attached to things, it is 
attached to itself. While dividing self and things, it is tied to things and 
hence can neither truly become one with things nor truly become one’s 
self. This mode of being is an essential, intrinsic aspect of the human mind; 
but regarded from the field of the a/aya-consciousness which forms the 
basis of this discriminative mind, the standpoint of the latter proves to have 
no foundation in truth whatsoever, to be “imaginary in nature” (parikalpita 
svabhava).
Discriminative knowledge is essentially falsehood (abhiita parikalpa). 
Yet at the same time, considering the essential connection between the 
seventh consciousness which is the seat of the discriminating mind, and the 
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eighth or £/apa-consciousness, we can see how difficult it is to shake off this 
falsity. For the oZuya-consciousness which becomes the ground for pointing 
out the falsity of discrimination is at the same time the hidden root of 
discrimination; the two are as inseparable as roots from the earth. There­
fore, in order to free oneself from the discriminating mind and negate its 
falsity, one must break through the eighth as well as the seventh conscious­
ness. To crack the rigid frame of the ego-self, the force binding the frame 
together must also be tom loose from its roots up. This great latent force, 
determining the apparently free discriminative activity of the ego-self from 
within its hidden depths, imparts to it the character of necessity called 
karma. The connection between the seventh and eighth consciousnesses can 
in this sense also be designated the “karma-consciousness” of The Awaken­
ing of Faith in the Mahayana. Breaking through the frame of the ego-self 
is only accomplished by cutting the roots of this karma-consciousness which 
reach to its depths. This is the meaning of Zen master Hakuin’s saying, 
“Slice right through the field of the eighth consciousness.”
To cut through the mind of self-attachment that arises in the form of the 
ego-self is at the same time to go beyond the world (or the so-called 
“three worlds” of desire, form, and formlessness). This is the “great death” 
of Zen, which cuts through the roots of life and death for the first time. In 
consciousness-only theory, it is said that in extinguishing vijhana or con­
sciousness, the visaya or world of objects over against it is finally ex­
tinguished. What comes to be manifest here is the non-discriminating or 
fundamental knowledge which in usual Buddhist parlance is called prajha. 
Its standpoint is that which has transcended the world to the “other shore,” 
which has gone beyond all possible beings in their very beingness, i.e., 
insofar as they are thought to be, and in this sense is called absolute empti­
ness (funyata). This of course does not mean void or empty in a privative 
sense, emptiness as opposed to fullness. Rather it is the standpoint of the 
oneness of mind and things. Here all things cease to be the world of ob­
jects over against the discriminative mind, and manifest their true form in 
the field of absolute emptiness. All things manifesting their true form is 
nothing other than non-discriminating knowledge. This then is the stand­
point of the great wisdom of the oneness of things and mind, the wisdom 
that is prajha. It is here that the realization of self as no-self, the awareness 
of one’s own true self, occurs. All things are brought to light as being origi­
nally without self-nature, “self’’-less, as being no-self-nature. All things are 
“no-self-nature as emptiness.” And this at the same time means that each 
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and every thing becomes manifest in its true reality. Consciousness-only 
theory calls this field of self-realization or awareness "parinispanna 
svabhava”—perfected, real nature.
IV
Earlier I cited the Zen saying, “Directly pointing to man’s mind, seeing 
into one’s own true nature and becoming Buddha.” From the example of 
consciousness-only theory just given we may surmise the kind of back­
ground against which “man’s mind” is understood. Based in its depths on 
the universal mind coextensive with the whole world which it has in com­
mon with all other animals, the human mind sinks roots as far as the 
n/nya-consciousness that may be said to underlie the “three worlds”— 
past, present and future—in their entirety. And where this underlying basis 
is overcome, there the field of absolute emptiness is lying in wait. This over­
all background is borne deep in the mind of even a single human being and 
forms his self-nature. The phrase “pointing directly” presents the stand­
point where one returns immediately and directly to his own mind just as 
it is, without going astray in any other direction; it is the standpoint which 
does not allow one to separate his own self and become involved with the 
world and its various domains and phenomena. As I will touch upon later, 
it even excludes committing oneself to Buddha. But within one’s own mind 
to which one returns is stored the source of the mind of all living things, 
that is to say, the place ofprnywa-emptiness which is oneness with things as 
they really are. The investigation of one’s own mind, when it is radically 
pursued, takes on the meaning of seeing through to the core of sentient 
beings, the world, and Buddha.
The same holds true with respect to the “nature” of the self in the phrase 
“seeing into one’s own true nature and becoming Buddha.” One’s own 
self-nature penetrates to the original nature of Buddha. This is whyman too 
is said to be endowed with Buddha-nature. Hence, seeing through to one’s 
own self-nature comes to have the meaning of “becoming Buddha,” of 
becoming truly awakened. Of course, given the idea of “self” we usually 
have, it may be quite difficult to conceive of seeing into one’s own true 
nature and becoming Buddha. Ordinarily we grasp the self on the field of 
opposition between subject and object, from the standpoint of what con­
sciousness-only theory calls illusory discrimination. This is the way of being 
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of the self which has become self-centered by settling in the seventh con­
sciousness or manas, to use the language of consciousness-only doctrine 
again. Looking at the matter from the standpoint of this self, it is only 
natural that it be difficult to conceive of a human being becoming Bud­
dha. In view of this sort of idea of a self-centered self, which for Western 
people is commonly the only idea of self they have, it is natural 
to think it nonsense that man could become God. Yet the self is not 
something which exists isolated from the world. Such a mode of ex­
istence itself would be based on the illusory discrimination of the self, on 
being self-centered. When this discriminating mind is dropped, our own 
self-nature manifests the character of Buddha-nature beyond the alaya- 
consciousness.
Our Zen slogan can be said to gather the doctrine of “mind” with its 
epistemological, ontological and cosmological character as found, for 
example, in consciousness-only theory, directly into the standpoint of ex­
istence and to turn it into the real content of existential self-investigation. 
It is for this reason that the kensho or “seeing into one’s own true nature” 
that Zen makes its motto is sought in the direct and immediate experience 
of “sudden enlightenment.” Separated from our actual here and now ex­
istence, the study of doctrines becomes mere speculation. In Buddhism, 
speculation apart from existence is called vain discourse (prapanca). In his 
Song of Zazen, Hakuin expressed this “directly pointing to man’s mind, 
seeing into one’s own true nature and becoming Buddha” in this way:
How much more when you turn to yourself 
and directly confirm your own self-nature. 
Then your self-nature is no-nature; 
you have parted from vain words.
To return to oneself just as one is, directly see through to one’s own self­
nature on the field of prajna-emptiness, and realize “no-self-nature-as- 
emptiness,” is to drop the standpoint of mere speculation. This verse aptly 
expresses the original character of the way called the investigation of self. 
It may well be on the same track, at least in its direction, as the standpoint 
of existence first formulated by Kierkegaard in his critique of Hegel’s specu­
lative standpoint.
In the tenth century, during the Period of the Five Dynasties in China, 
Hogen Bun’eki (Fa-yen Wen-i), who had founded a particular style of Zen 
known as the Hogen School, wrote a verse on “perfected real nature.” 
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Since we have touched upon the consciousness-only theory, let us cite 
this verse as an example of how this doctrine was assimilated into Zen 
and given existential import.
With reason exhausted, feelings and deliberations
are forgotten.
How can it be likened to anything! 
Right here this frosty night’s moon 
Sinks serenely into the river valley ahead. 
Ripened fruit hangs heavy with monkeys, 
The mountains deepen as if to lead astray. 
Raising my head, there’s still some light— 
Originally to the West of my abode.3
3 This verse is cited in Case 34 of the Blue Cliff Records (Pi-yen-lu).
“Perfected real nature” means that by way of the investigation of self the 
Buddha-nature of the self comes to be manifest out of the self like an un­
earthed jewel. At the point where the discriminating mind (the" feelings and 
deliberations” of our verse) has scrutinized reason exhaustively and 
reached the extremity of reason, it forgets itself, and forgets reason as well. 
Our original self-nature, Hakuin’s “self-nature as no-nature,” shines forth 
as something beyond comparison. “My mind is like the autumn moon,” 
writes the Chinese poet Han Shan (Cold Mountain); but, he continues, 
it really withstands all comparison—this moon shining purely in the 
deep, blue pool of water. In Hogen’s verse, the moon setting in the river 
valley on a frosty night, the monkeys coming to pick the fruit, etc., all 
only depict features of Hogen’s daily mountain life. All this however, 
is no other than “perfected real nature” as the Zen state. It is, as it is, 
the mind of H6gen, a man of Zen. We must not understand the features 
expressed in this verse as a description of a landscape. The Zen master 
Kassan Zenne (Chia-shan Shan-kui, named after the mountain of his 
abode), was once asked, “How are things around Kassan?” He replied, 
“Monkeys holding their young in their arms retreat behind the blue 
ridge, birds holding flowers in their beaks plummet before the blue 
cliff.” Tradition has it that Hogen said of this phrase, “For thirty years 
I mistook this to be a picture of the world around Kassan.” Whatever 
Hogen might have really meant at the time he said this, the features of 
Hogen’s mountain life in the verse above as well are not just a description 
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of the world around a quiet, secluded place in the mountains.
At the conclusion of his Faust Goethe has the Chorus Mysticus sing, 
“Alles Vergangliche 1st nur ein Gleichnis"—all changing things are only 
the likeness [of eternal things]. The expression in the second line of Ho- 
gen’s verse is evidently the equivalent of this Gleichnis. But for Goethe the 
features of mountain life too would belong to the world of changing things, 
would be only a likeness of eternal things. Yet Hogen’s self-nature is some­
thing wholly beyond likening. It transcends the distinction between im­
permanence and eternity; it goes beyond the relativity of impermanent vs. 
eternal. If we are to speak of the impermanent, then the features of this 
mountain life are impermanent through and through, are not even a like­
ness, metaphor, or symbol of eternal things. They are, as they are, the real 
aspects of mountain life. Or, if we are to speak of the eternal, they are eter­
nal through and through, for which we cannot even find a likeness in the 
impermanent. They are, as they are, emptiness, and absolute emptiness, as 
such, is the suchness of mountain life—is ultimately Hogen’s own mind. In 
comparison, even Goethe can be said to have lapsed into reason, into logos, 
Hogen’s state here reveals the existentialized version of the “perfected real 
nature” of consciousness-only theory.
The problem of mind came to be a central issue throughout the history of 
Buddhism. And that is only natural, insofar as the source of Buddhism lies 
in what is called the perfect enlightenment or satori of Sakyamuni. The 
consciousness-only theory which developed and spread from India to 
China was of fundamental significance for the consideration of this prob­
lem. But representative Chinese doctrinal systems too, such as the Tendai 
(T’ien-t’ai) and Kegon (Hua-yen) which were built upon these considera­
tions, can be seen as profound attempts to exhaust the same problem of 
mind. The Tendai School speaks of the three thousand worlds in one 
thought-moment, and of the perfect harmony of the three truths of the 
empty, the provisional, and the middle. The Kegon School teaches the 
non-distinction between Buddha, sentient beings, and mind; and elucidates 
the interpenetration of all things: reason unimpeded by phenomena 
(rijimuge) and phenomena unimpeded by phenomena (Jijimuge). All of these 
are ideas concerning the “mind.” The same concern can be traced back to 
what is called primitive Buddhism and Theravada. Not only there, but also 
in non-Buddhist teachings such as Confucianism and Taoism, the prob­
lem of mind was constantly a matter of serious concern. Then, from its 
completely free standpoint, Zen was able to find in all these a clue to the 
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investigation of self, and an occasion to take off from there. What we said 
above of Hogen and consciousness-only theory was nothing more than 
simply one example of this—except that the occasion of Hogen’s attaining 
satori for the first time bears a special relation to consciousness-only 
theory. The story is as follows.
On a pilgrimage seeking the Way with two companion monks, Hogen 
stopped to rest at the temple of a Zen priest named Jizo (Kuei Ch’en) one 
rainy day. When the rain cleared and they were about to set off again, 
Jizo, who had come to see them off, remarked, “It is said you usually ex­
pound the doctrine that the three worlds are mind only.” Then, pointing 
to a rock in the garden, he asked, “Is that rock inside your mind or outside 
it ?” “Inside my mind, of course,” was the answer Hogen gave, typical of 
consciousness-only theory. Jizo immediately retorted, “By what karmic 
fate I do not know, but a man is wandering around with a lump of stone in 
his mind. He must feel quite heavy.” At a loss for a word to counter, Hogen 
at length took off his sandals again and stayed on together with his compan­
ions, advancing various views to settle the issue. After a month or so of 
this, the monk Jizo at last said, “When it comes to the Buddha Dharma, all 
things present themselves as they are.” It is said that Hogen was greatly 
enlightened upon hearing this.
“All things present themselves as they are” means that the Buddha 
Dharma manifests itself precisely therein, that every single thing is manifest 
entirely as it is, as clearly and distinctly as what one sees in one’s own 
hand. This is the basic principle of consciousness-only doctrine: “three 
worlds—mind only,” but as it is treated from the standpoint of Zen. In the 
way of self-investigation called “directly pointing to man’s mind,” this 
signifies that “I” directly see “myself” in the appearance of every single 
thing just as it is, as though two mirrors were mutually reflecting one 
another. In contrast, when Hogen first answered “in my mind,” his 
“three worlds—mind only” was, to use the modern idiom, an idealistic 
position. It was a standpoint of seeing the rock as a mental entity. Yet 
the opposite of this mentalism of “mind only,” i.e., a materialism of 
“things only,” would fare no better. So long as the materialist is unable 
to see in one manifest rock the reality of the self that absolutely cannot 
be objectified, the shadow of the self that sees the rock will be projected, 
so to speak, upon the rock’s hidden side. Materialism cannot escape the 
situation that the problem of the mind lies concealed in the appearance of 
every material thing. Or we can put it this way: if idealism’s “in the mind” 
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loads the rock into the front of the mind, materialism’s “outside the mind” 
sticks the mind onto the back of the rock. From the standpoint of Zen, 
both mind and things are seen from a perspective that completely tran­
scends these two opposed ways of seeing.
Still, the problem of the world and all its things is one that should be 
touched upon again. But before doing this it will be necessary to first ex­
amine the problem of mind a little more closely. That is to say, what I have 
related so far scarcely broaches the topic of the investigation of self from 
the standpoint of “directly pointing to man’s mind.” Or again, after having 
undergone the problem of mind, other matters such as Buddha, the world 
and all things, and human relationships, become problems anew. As 
stated before, these matters can be said to be a development of the problem 
of mind. I do not know how deeply I can go into these problems, but at 
any rate such fundamental issues as these await our consideration.
Translated by John C. Maraldo
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